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Abstract 30 
Background: Cost-effectiveness analysis is an important tool for informing treatment 31 
coverage and pricing decisions, yet no consensus exists about what threshold for the 32 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) in dollars per quality-adjusted life year gained 33 
(QALY) indicates whether treatments are likely to be cost-effective in the United States (US). 34 
Objective: To estimate a US cost-effectiveness threshold based on health opportunity costs.  35 
Design: Simulation of short-term mortality and morbidity attributable to individuals dropping 36 
health insurance due to increased healthcare expenditures passed though as premium 37 
increases. Model inputs came from demographic data and the literature; 95% uncertainty 38 
intervals (UI) were constructed. 39 
Setting: Population-based. 40 
Participants: Simulated cohort of 100,000 individuals from the US population with direct 41 
purchase private health insurance. 42 
Measurements: Per $10,000,000 (USD 2019) population treatment cost increase: the number 43 
of individuals dropping insurance coverage, the number of additional deaths, and QALYs lost 44 
from increased mortality and morbidity.  45 
Results: Per $10,000,000 (USD 2019) increase in healthcare expenditures, 1860 (95% UI: 46 
1080-2840) individuals were simulated to become uninsured, causing 5 (95% UI: 3-11) 47 
deaths, 81 (95% UI: 40-170) and 15 (95% UI: 6-32) QALYs lost from mortality and 48 
morbidity, respectively, implying a cost-effectiveness threshold of $104,000/QALY (95% UI: 49 
$51,000-$209,000 USD 2019). Given available evidence, there is about 14% probability that 50 
the threshold exceeds $150,000/QALY and about 48% probability it lies below 51 
$100,000/QALY. 52 
Limitations: Estimates were sensitive to inputs, most notably the effects of losing insurance 53 
on mortality and of premium increases on becoming uninsured. Health opportunity costs may 54 
vary by population. Non-health opportunity costs were excluded.  55 
Conclusion: Given current evidence, treatments with ICERs above the range $100,000-56 
$150,000/QALY are unlikely to be cost-effective in the US.  57 
Primary Funding Source: None. 58 
 59 
Abstract Word Count: 275/275  60 
Introduction 61 
As healthcare spending in the United States (US) continues to rise (1), life expectancy 62 
gains have failed to keep pace and are showing signs of reversal (2). Seeking partial 63 
explanations for both trends, economists point out that the US healthcare system readily 64 
adopts and pays for costly new treatments without requiring improvements in health 65 
outcomes to justify those costs (3–8). Spending less on treatments offering little or no 66 
improvement in outcomes would allow more spending on other treatments potentially 67 
offering larger health gains, while not increasing the overall healthcare budget. Of course, we 68 
could simply spend more on healthcare overall, but that would leave us with less to spend on 69 
other important determinants of health and well-being, like education, housing, the 70 
environment or poverty reduction (9). Either way, if we accept improving population health 71 
as a central goal of the healthcare system, then we should seek to use healthcare resources 72 
more efficiently.  73 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a tool for assessing whether a new treatment is an 74 
efficient use of limited resources (10). The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) 75 
measures net resources needed to improve health outcomes by one unit when using a new 76 
treatment compared to the next-best available treatment for a condition. The resources 77 
considered go beyond just treatment prices and include costs (or savings) resulting from 78 
treatment effects over time. Although any measurable health outcome (e.g., complete 79 
response, tobacco quits, or %HbA1c) can go in the denominator of an ICER, the most 80 
common measure is the quality-adjusted life year (QALY), which integrates differences 81 
between treatments in both mortality and health-related quality of life (11). Using a broad 82 
measure like the QALY provides a common denominator for comparing the efficiency of 83 
treatments across the spectrum of healthcare, from cancer treatment to smoking cessation to 84 
diabetes management.   85 
Many countries with centralized systems of healthcare provision or payment use cost-86 
effectiveness to guide treatment coverage and pricing (12). In the United Kingdom (UK), for 87 
example, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) generally 88 
recommends that treatments with ICERs above a £20,000-£30,000/QALY threshold not be 89 
covered by the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales (13,14). Thresholds 90 
used for recommending coverage or negotiating prices vary across countries; sometimes they 91 
are explicitly stated, while other times they are inferred from past decisions (15). 92 
Until recently, cost-effectiveness has played more of an informative and less of a 93 
formal role in the US. Due to public and political concerns over rationing, Medicare has long 94 
avoided using cost-effectiveness in coverage decisions (16). In 2010, lawmakers even 95 
inserted language into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) preventing 96 
Medicare from using a cost-per-QALY threshold to determine treatment coverage (17). So, 97 
what’s changed? With rapid growth in healthcare costs (and in the amount of those costs paid 98 
by patients), clinicians are increasingly aware of “financial toxicity” and its effect on the 99 
health of their patients (18,19). Calls for national action have included “value-based pricing” 100 
based on cost-effectiveness (20).  101 
The independent, non-governmental Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 102 
(ICER) has increased the visibility of cost-effectiveness as a tool for payers to negotiate 103 
prices (21,22). In 2018, CVS Caremark announced a pharmacy benefits package where 104 
treatments with ICERs above $100,000/QALY as assessed by ICER risk exclusion from its 105 
formulary (23). In 2018, the New York State Drug Utilization Review Board used an ICER 106 
assessment to recommend the state’s Medicaid program pursue a manufacturer’s rebate for 107 
cystic fibrosis treatment lumacaftor/ivacaftor (Orkambi) to bring its ICER below 108 
$150,000/QALY (24). The US Veteran’s Administration is also collaborating with ICER to 109 
support drug coverage and price negotiation using value-based price benchmarks based on a 110 
range of cost-effectiveness thresholds from $100,000-$150,000/QALY (25).  111 
The Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (H.R. 3), passed in 2019 by the 112 
US House of Representatives (26), would cap federally-negotiated drug prices at 120% of an 113 
Average International Market price based on six countries, five of which either explicitly 114 
(Australia, Canada, UK) or optionally (France and Germany) use cost-effectiveness in 115 
coverage and pricing (27–30), with another (Japan) considering formalizing its use (31). The 116 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that H.R. 3 would lower Medicare Part D spending 117 
by $456 billion from 2020-2029, assuming the federal government will not agree to prices 118 
resulting in an ICER exceeding $520,000/QALY (32,33). Although its status is unknown 119 
(34), a presidential executive order issued on July 24, 2020 would tie Medicare Part B drug 120 
prices to those in “economically comparable” countries, many of which base pricing and 121 
coverage on cost-effectiveness. These actions may pressure manufacturers to be more open to 122 
cost-effectiveness analysis in the US, preferring prices negotiated under a US threshold to 123 
being tied to other countries where thresholds are likely lower (35). 124 
In this paper, we assess potential cost-effectiveness thresholds for the US using a 125 
health opportunity cost approach. This approach starts with the assumption that we wish to 126 
get the most population health for what we already spend on healthcare. The question of 127 
whether we spend too much or too little on healthcare overall is set aside temporarily. 128 
Holding healthcare spending fixed, covering a new, more costly treatment potentially 129 
benefitting one group of patients means spending less on other healthcare received by other 130 
patients. Health opportunity cost reflects the health lost among patients for whom healthcare 131 
expenditures are reduced to pay for the new treatment. When a new treatment costs more per 132 
QALY gained than the healthcare it displaces, then health opportunity costs exceed health 133 
benefits, and overall population health (measured in QALYs) declines (36). The point where 134 
this occurs defines the threshold.  135 
In countries with fixed healthcare budgets and centralized decision-making, health 136 
opportunity cost makes a lot of sense. That’s why, for example, researchers have based 137 
estimates of the UK cost-effectiveness threshold on how much health is lost when less care is 138 
provided to the NHS patient population (largely through decreased services, including longer 139 
wait times and more restrictive treatment eligibility criteria) to pay for a new treatment (37–140 
40). These estimates suggest that services displaced when paying for new treatments in the 141 
UK cost about £5,000-£15,000 to produce one QALY (38), well below the £20,000-142 
£30,000/QALY threshold that NICE uses to judge cost-effectiveness. 143 
The Second US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (US Panel) and 144 
ICER have both called for research on opportunity cost-based cost-effectiveness thresholds 145 
for the US (41,42). However, in the US, there is no single defined budget for healthcare, and 146 
costs are spread across health insurance risk pools funded by taxes and premiums. Identifying 147 
where health opportunity costs fall is more challenging. To overcome this challenge, we relax 148 
the assumption that healthcare expenditures are fixed and instead consider what happens 149 
when private insurers spend more, but increase premiums to cover costs (41,43–45). We 150 
identify health opportunity costs for the US population with direct purchase health insurance 151 
based on empirical estimates of the percentage of plan members likely to drop coverage when 152 
premiums increase, experiencing increased mortality and morbidity as a result.  153 
Methods 154 
The first step in our simulation was to estimate how many individuals would become 155 
uninsured due to a premium increase. We simulated a cohort having the same age distribution 156 
as the US population covered by direct purchase insurance (46). Using 2019 average ACA 157 
Marketplace premiums (47) as a baseline, we then estimated the percentage premium 158 
increase necessary for an insurance plan to fully pass along a hypothetical healthcare cost 159 
increase to plan members. Using estimates of the percent of plan members becoming 160 
uninsured per percent premium increase (known as the premium elasticity of coverage) by 161 
age group from a study of ACA Marketplace premium increases (48), we simulated the 162 
number who would become uninsured by year of age. 163 
The second step was to estimate how much mortality and morbidity would likely 164 
result among individuals losing insurance coverage in step one. Using an estimate of the 165 
number needed to gain health insurance to avert one death over a short time horizon from a 166 
study of mortality reductions associated with ACA Medicaid expansion (49), we solved for 167 
the implied relative risk of mortality from becoming uninsured, which, when applied to 168 
mortality rates by age from US life tables (50) in proportion to the age distribution of those 169 
simulated to drop coverage in step one, would yield the expected number of deaths in one 170 
year. This allowed us to apportion deaths attributable to becoming uninsured to each year of 171 
age, reflecting varying baseline mortality. We estimated QALYs lost due to mortality 172 
accounting for remaining life expectancy using US life tables, to which we applied health-173 
related quality of life (SF-6D-12V2) by year of age estimated from the National Health 174 
Measurement Study (51). Lost quality-adjusted life expectancy was discounted at 3% per 175 
year, following US Panel recommendations (41). Finally, we estimated QALYs lost due to 176 
morbidity attributable to becoming uninsured among survivors for one year. Based on a 177 
recent evidence synthesis (52), we assumed 10% of morbidity is amenable to healthcare. We 178 
further assumed losing insurance had the same proportional effect on amenable morbidity as 179 
it had on mortality. 180 
Using these estimates, we then calculated health opportunity costs as QALYs lost per 181 
each additional dollar spent (2019 USD). We note that multiplying additional expenditures by 182 
a factor results in a directly proportional effect on QALYs lost. Therefore, the health 183 
opportunity cost ratio stays constant for any hypothetical cost increase. For similar reasons, 184 
the health opportunity cost ratio does not vary with cohort size. For interpretability, we report 185 
QALYs lost attributable to a hypothetical $10,000,000 expenditure increase in a cohort of 186 
100,000 plan members, causing a $100 (1.6%) per-member per year premium increase. The 187 
implied cost-effectiveness threshold is the reciprocal of the health opportunity cost ratio. 188 
Because our model inputs come from uncertain estimates, we used a Bayesian 189 
approach to see how uncertainty affects the threshold. We repeated the simulation 50,000 190 
times, using different sets of model inputs randomly chosen from probability distributions 191 
with means and spreads reflecting available evidence about each input’s likely value. We 192 
estimated the probability that the threshold exceeds a specified value by counting the number 193 
of times the simulated threshold exceeded that value and dividing by 50,000. For policy 194 
relevance, we assessed the probabilities that the threshold lies above and below the $100,000-195 
$150,000/QALY range ICER uses for value-based pricing (42). For a detailed description of 196 
our simulation, see the Technical Appendix.  197 
Role of the Funding Source 198 
 None. 199 
IRB Approval 200 
 Our study was not human subjects research as covered under 45 CFR part 46.  201 
Results 202 
For each additional $10,000,000 (USD 2019) in healthcare expenditures, about 1,860 203 
(95% UI: 1,080-2,840) individuals with direct purchase private insurance were simulated to 204 
become uninsured due to passed-through premium increases, causing 5 additional deaths 205 
(95% UI: 3-11), 81 QALYs lost due to mortality (95% UI: 40-170) and 15 QALYs lost due to 206 
morbidity (95% UI: 6-32). A new treatment with incremental cost of $10,000,000 would 207 
therefore need to increase QALYs by at least 96 (95% UI: 48-195) to avoid reducing total 208 
population health, implying a threshold of $10,000,000 96 QALYs⁄ = $104,000/QALY (95% 209 
UI: $51,000-$209,000 USD 2019).  210 
The threshold exceeded $150,000/QALY in 7,006/50,000 simulations, suggesting 211 
14% probability that the threshold exceeds $150,000/QALY (Figure 1). The threshold was 212 
less than $100,000/QALY in 23,902/50,000 simulations, suggesting 48% probability that the 213 
threshold lies below $100,000/QALY. Input base case values and one-way sensitivity 214 
analysis results are presented in Table 1 (for additional details see Appendix Tables 1 and 2 215 
and Appendix Figure 1). Estimated thresholds were most sensitive to the effect of losing 216 
insurance on mortality followed by premium elasticity of coverage among 18-34-year-olds, 217 
and 35-54-year-olds. Input values indicating a larger effect of becoming uninsured on 218 
mortality and morbidity, a larger number of individuals dropping coverage due to premium 219 
increases, or a larger proportion of costs passed through to plan members increased the 220 
opportunity cost and therefore lowered the threshold. 221 
Discussion 222 
Historically, US cost-effectiveness studies have compared ICERs to a variety of 223 
thresholds ranging from roughly $50,000-$300,000/QALY (53–56). The lower end of that 224 
range has been justified on an apocryphal argument that Medicare revealed its willingness to 225 
pay per QALY by creating a special program covering dialysis for end-stage renal disease, a 226 
treatment supposedly having an ICER of about $50,000/QALY (53). The upper end of that 227 
range is supported by Braithwaite et al., who estimated individual willingness to pay to 228 
reduce morbidity and mortality through purchases of private insurance that increase 229 
healthcare use (56). Our uncertainty analysis suggests that these bounds are likely 230 
inconsistent with a threshold based on health opportunity costs, given available evidence 231 
(Figure 1).  232 
Recently, Phelps derived a threshold directly from principles of individual economic 233 
choice (57). Assuming individuals with typical aversion to financial risk balance their 234 
expenditures on health and other consumption over time to maximize their expected well-235 
being, Phelps found that individuals with incomes of $50,000 (approximately US per-capita 236 
disposable personal income of $50,731 in December 2019) (58) should be willing to pay 237 
twice that amount ($100,000) to increase quality-adjusted life expectancy by one QALY. 238 
This result is close to our own base case estimate of $104,000/QALY despite being based on 239 
a very different approach. 240 
All three of the thresholds referenced above are grounded in “welfarist economics,” 241 
where individuals make choices to maximize their overall well-being, not just their health 242 
(59,60). If consumers are rational and well-informed about the true benefits and costs of 243 
healthcare relative to other things they could do with their money, and if healthcare is bought 244 
and sold in a perfectly competitive market, then willingness to pay per QALY should 245 
coincide with the full opportunity cost of healthcare expenditures (61). 246 
Our analysis cannot make such a claim. First, although we rely on empirical estimates 247 
of individuals choosing whether or not to continue purchasing health insurance when 248 
premiums increase, we do not assume their choices are fully informed or made in perfectly 249 
competitive markets. Health economists have long recognized that healthcare is unlike other 250 
goods and services because full information about its benefits is never known by all parties in 251 
advance (62), and many factors about the US market for healthcare cause prices to differ 252 
from actual costs (63,64), A reviewer noted that if consumers underestimate the health risks 253 
of becoming uninsured, then observed premium elasticity of coverage may be higher than 254 
optimal, and our estimate could serve as a lower bound for the willingness to pay threshold. 255 
Second, our analysis considered just one possible mechanism of action, or as 256 
economists like to say, one margin – the effect of treatment cost increases on direct purchase 257 
private insurance premiums and insurance coverage. We did not consider other relevant 258 
margins – for example, the possible effects of increasing healthcare costs on patient co-pays 259 
or wait times, or on the offering and generosity of employer-sponsored insurance coverage or 260 
on public insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. In such cases, the opportunity 261 
costs of increasing healthcare expenditures will be borne by someone (e.g., on the health and 262 
finances of insured patients, the take-home income of employees, on taxpayers or 263 
beneficiaries of other government expenditures). The existence of multiple margins 264 
emphasizes that there are many potential opportunity costs in the heterogeneous US health 265 
economy, and therefore a range of thresholds may be valid. 266 
Third, we do not estimate the full opportunity cost of increased healthcare 267 
expenditures (including reduced overall well-being from consuming less goods and services 268 
like housing, food or education, from reduced savings, or from the lost value of financial risk 269 
protection that having health insurance is meant to confer). Rather, we frame our argument on 270 
health opportunity costs alone. While our approach is incomplete from the standpoint of 271 
welfarist economics, it is consistent with so-called “extra-welfarism (59,65).” Under that 272 
framework, the goal of health policy-makers is to maximize total population health given 273 
available healthcare resources, a goal that requires understanding health opportunity costs. 274 
We believe this perspective is valid and compelling. By focusing on health opportunity costs, 275 
the trade-off between the health of identified patients and the overall population is brought to 276 
the surface.(66) 277 
Other studies have estimated US thresholds based on health opportunity costs by 278 
extrapolating from other countries. Using estimates for the UK by Claxton et al. (37), Woods 279 
et al. estimated a range for the US threshold of $24,283-$40,112/QALY (67). Their analysis 280 
assumes a consistent relationship between GDP per capita and health opportunity costs across 281 
several countries, which given fundamental differences between the US healthcare system 282 
and others, may be strained. Ochalek and Lomas estimated the US threshold to be $60,475-283 
$97,851 per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) averted based on cross-sectional country-284 
level estimates of disability and life-expectancy as a function of national expenditures on 285 
healthcare and other determinants of health, including income, education and sanitation (68). 286 
Beyond difficulties in comparison due to the use of DALYs (69), their range may be lower 287 
than ours due to the ecological assumption that the relationship of healthcare expenditures to 288 
health outcomes across countries applies to within the US. 289 
Our approach has other limitations. Although informed by theory and empirical 290 
estimates, our model inputs are uncertain. For example, estimates of the premium elasticity of 291 
coverage vary substantially (70–72). We used an estimate by Saltzman (48) due to its 292 
recency, its focus on the ACA Marketplace, and its estimation of elasticity by age group, 293 
which we felt was important given age-related differences in morbidity and mortality. While 294 
the weight of evidence demonstrates that extending health insurance coverage reduces 295 
morbidity and mortality, estimates of that effect vary widely (73–76). We chose the midpoint 296 
of a range of 239-316 individuals needed to gain insurance to avert one death for those newly 297 
covered by Medicaid expansions in California and Washington estimated by Sommers (49). 298 
Individuals who gained Medicaid coverage may differ from those covered by direct purchase 299 
private insurance; however we note that many people cycle between Medicaid, direct 300 
purchase insurance and being uninsured (77). Sommers noted that up to 20% of the estimated 301 
mortality reduction may have come from increased use of antiretroviral drugs for HIV in the 302 
late 1990s and early 2000s. A recent study by Borgschulte and Vogler of post-ACA Medicaid 303 
expansions from 2014 to 2017 estimated that 310 individuals would need to gain insurance to 304 
avert one death (75), which is within the 239-316 range estimated by Sommers. Our 305 
sensitivity analysis range is wider still (Range: 65-701, 95%UI 155.9-435.1), reflecting 306 
substantial uncertainty. Using the Borgschulte and Vogler estimate would increase our 307 
estimated threshold to $115,000/QALY.  308 
We also note that our analysis assumes health opportunity cost in QALYs lost per 309 
dollar spent is a constant ratio, regardless of the magnitude of additional health expenditures 310 
considered. Blockbuster treatments for common chronic diseases, or those that offer potential 311 
cures for uncommon but life-threatening diseases, may be cost-effective when assessed 312 
against a fixed threshold, but not be affordable (78). As such treatments claim a larger share 313 
of a healthcare budget, opportunity costs may increase disproportionately – effectively 314 
lowering the threshold (79). Price negotiations for treatments with large budget impacts could 315 
target the lower end of a range of threshold values to account for affordability (80). 316 
Given overall uncertainty about cost-effectiveness thresholds, it would be prudent to 317 
avoid the temptation to set in stone any single threshold as the sole test for determining 318 
whether treatments are of individual or social value (81). While there have been attempts to 319 
broaden economic evaluation of new treatments beyond costs per QALY gained (82), we 320 
must recognize that cost-effectiveness analysis, as currently practiced, largely ignores 321 
important ethical considerations, including concerns for equity and the instrumental value of 322 
human life regardless of age or underlying health (83). 323 
New treatments are often rightly met with enthusiasm from patient groups and 324 
clinicians, but the health consequences that increased treatment costs have on others in the 325 
healthcare system more broadly also tend to be ignored. Individuals bearing health 326 
opportunity costs through the mechanism we describe are likely to come from poorer 327 
population groups lacking political constituency. In a review of health economist Uwe 328 
Reinhardt’s final work, Priced Out, Jeff Goldsmith notes: “those who remain out in the cold 329 
[the uninsured] are a diverse bunch, united only by their marginality or invisibility and 330 
lacking organized advocacy in Congress (84).” 331 
Although we cannot expect individual clinicians to consider the health of any patients 332 
other than their own while at the bedside, the health opportunity costs borne by anonymous 333 
members of society remain an ethical and policy imperative (66). Collectively, clinicians 334 
have substantial power to shape the debate over affordability of care they provide. Clinicians 335 
can and do play a role in making healthcare costs visible to the public and to policymakers. 336 
The question of whether and where to draw the line on what makes a treatment cost-effective 337 
is becoming a matter of urgent economic and clinical significance. Clinicians who are 338 
concerned about the effects of increasing costs on patient and population health, or who are 339 
wary of the ethical, economic or health consequences of using cost-effectiveness thresholds 340 
should engage in this debate. 341 
Despite the limitations of our analysis, and of cost-effectiveness more broadly, we 342 
believe it is reasonable to expect that when an authority, be it a government agency or a 343 
private insurance plan, agrees on whether or how much to pay for a treatment, that decision 344 
will, “first, do no harm” to population health. Setting cost-effectiveness thresholds too high 345 
(or ignoring them altogether) sustains current conditions for a self-reinforcing cycle of 346 
escalating healthcare costs and continued disappointing progress on improving population 347 
health.  348 
 349 
Protocol: not available 350 
Simulation Code: Available on GitHub: https://github.com/djvanness/USthreshold 351 
Data: National Health Measurement Study available at: 352 
https://www.disc.wisc.edu/archivereport/downloadForm2.asp 353 
 354 
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Table 1. Key Input Values and One-Way Sensitivity Analysis Results 
















       
Number needed to lose insurance to result in one 
expected death in one year (persons) 
277.5 (155.9 to 435.1) ($61,000 to $157,000) < 267 > 414 Sommers(49) 
Premium elasticity of coverage: age 18-34 (%/%) -1.5 (-2.38 to -0.62) ($78,000 to $152,000) < -1.6 > -0.65 
Saltzman(48) 
 
Premium elasticity of coverage: age 35-54 (%/%) -1.05 (-1.78 to -0.43) ($81,000 to $136,000) < -1.15 > -0.24 
Saltzman(48) 
 
Percentage of additional costs passed through as 
premium increases (%) 
100% (83% to 117%) ($125,000 to $89,000) > 104% < 69% Assumption 
Baseline annual direct purchase private insurance 
premium (2019 USD) 
$6,214  ($5,147 to $7,369) ($86,000 to $123,000) < $5,993 > $8,990 
Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid 
Services(47) 
Percentage of morbidity amenable to healthcare (%) 10% (5.7% to 15.5%) ($111,000 to $95,000) > 12.2% NV 
Kaplan and 
Milstein(52) 




*Inputs are ordered from most to least influential on the width of the 95% uncertainty interval for the resulting threshold value. 
**The ordering of values in the threshold 95% uncertainty intervals corresponds with the ordering of inputs in the input 95% uncertainty interval. 
NV = No value for this input can cause the threshold to exceed $150,000/QALY when all other inputs are fixed at their base case value. 

Figure 1. Frequency of calculated threshold values in 50,000 simulations with varying input values. Blue shaded 
area contains 23,902/50000 = 48% threshold values less than $100,000/QALY and orange shaded area contains 
7,006/50,000 = 14% threshold values greater than $150,000/QALY. Horizontal error bar depicts the 95% 
uncertainty interval. The vertical dashed line depicts the base case estimate of $104,000/QALY. 
 
